Are Death Doulas Subject to Funeral Service Licensing? Free Speech and the Richwine Decision

When Lauren Richwine founded her Fort Wayne, Indiana business, Death Done Differently, she envisioned helping families navigate one of life’s most difficult transitions. As a “death doula,” Richwine offers guidance and support to the dying and their loved ones—discussing end-of-life wishes, helping write letters to family members, and assisting survivors in planning meaningful memorial services. What she most likely did not anticipate was that the State of Indiana would attempt to silence her, sparking a constitutional battle that reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

On August 28, 2025, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the state cannot enforce its funeral licensing laws while the case is ongoing, allowing her to continue operating her business for now.

The case is important for several reasons. It is obviously personally important for Richwine, allowing her to continue offering her services. It is also significant in helping understand how far states can go in regulating speech under the guise of professional licensing.

But many incorrectly understand the decision too broadly—as providing a green light for death doulas across the United States or at least across the Seventh Circuit (which includes Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin). While valuable for death doulas in Indiana, the decision has limited applicability elsewhere. To understand why, it is useful to unpack how funeral service licensing works, the unique elements of the Indiana statute, and the holding by the Seventh Circuit.

Are Death Doulas Subject to Funeral Service Licensing? Free Speech and the Richwine Decision

Lauren Richwine’s Business

The Seventh Circuit emphasized that Richwine never claimed her services replaced those of a funeral director, but rather complemented them. Her services consisted primarily of communication, education, and emotional support.

The court noted that “[i]n her death doula capacity, Richwine discusses with her clients how they want to be remembered after death, helps clients write letters to loved ones, and provides emotional support to the dying.” The court continued that “after an individual dies, she helps the survivors determine a funeral program, select services at the funeral home of their choice, and, under the supervision of a licensed funeral director, she verbally advises the survivors about the moving, bathing, and dressing of the deceased.” [emphasis added]

It was significant to the court that Richwine’s website makes clear that she is not a funeral director and that her services must be performed “in conjunction with and under the supervision of a licensed funeral director.” Indeed, a footer on every page of the website states that “Death Done Differently is an educational consulting organization and is in no way considered a funeral establishment.” Her FAQ page explicitly noted that she does “NOT perform any services that funeral directors are licensed to perform.”

The State’s Investigation and Cease-and-Desist Order

Lauren Richwine. Image via Inelda

In June 2021, an unnamed person in the funeral services industry reported Richwine to the Indiana Professional Licensing Agency. The matter was referred to the Indiana Attorney General’s office, recommending investigation into the allegation that Richwine was engaged in the unlicensed practice of funeral services.

Following an investigation, the Indiana Attorney General’s office moved for a cease-and-desist order against Richwine. The motion identified a broad range of activities as constituting the “practice of funeral service,” including: discussing funeral options with clients; assisting with paperwork such as living wills; providing “verbal guidance with loved ones under the direct supervision of a licensed funeral director for moving, bathing, and dressing, and arrangement of the deceased”; consulting with families about music selections, religious acknowledgements, and funeral programming; accompanying families to funeral homes; “support with selection of goods and services,” and reviewing a funeral home’s general price list.

The final cease-and-desist order, developed through settlement negotiations between Richwine’s attorney and a Deputy Attorney General, demanded that Richwine stop advertising and providing “Full End of Life Planning,” “Facilitation of Community Death Care,” and “Support with Funeral Home” services. The final order also prohibited her from “counseling consumers, whether individually or in educational events open to the public, in any manner and through any medium, concerning the methods and alternatives for the final disposition of human remains.”

Nine days after the Indiana State Board of Funeral & Cemetery Services approved the cease-and-desist agreement, Richwine filed suit in the United States District Court in the Northern District of Indiana, alleging that enforcement of Indiana’s funeral licensing statutes violated her First Amendment rights and requesting a preliminary injunction.

A preliminary injunction is a court order issued early in a lawsuit that temporarily prevents a party from taking certain actions while the case proceeds. To receive one, a plaintiff has to show that they are likely to ultimately win the case. A preliminary injunction is not a final ruling—it just preserves the status quo until the court fully resolves the dispute. Here, Richwine was asking the court to allows her to continue operating Death Done Differently while the case proceeded.

The Legal Issues: First Amendment Protections and Occupational Licensing

The central legal question before the federal district court was whether Indiana’s funeral licensing laws, as applied to Richwine, unconstitutionally restricted her freedom of speech. This type of legal challenge—known as an “as-applied” challenge—does not argue that a law is unconstitutional in all circumstances, but rather that its application to a specific person or situation violates constitutional rights. This is important because a court’s ruling then only applies to the person who brought the lawsuit—but the statute still stands.

Indiana’s occupational licensing structure for funeral directors is typical: a statute defines certain activities as “the practice of funeral service” and requires individuals engaging in those activities to obtain a license. While this structure is consistent across states, the specific activities included vary significantly. Indiana’s statute (Ind. Code § 25-15-2-22) is particularly broad. The statute provides that “the practice of funeral services” includes:

(1) the application of the principles, methods, and techniques of mortuary science to the delivery of funeral services;

(2) the counseling of individuals concerning methods and alternatives for the final disposition of human remains;

(3) the prevention of the spread of infectious and contagious disease from human remains; and,

(4) compliance, in the delivery of funeral merchandise and services, with laws relating to health, public safety, and the environment.

It is that second clause regarding “counseling of individuals” that is most relevant to the Richwine lawsuit. As is typical, engaging in the practice of funeral services without a license is a crime. In Indiana, it is a Class B misdemeanor.

Richwine’s attorneys argued that the prohibition on “counseling”—including education and individualized advice—violates her freedom of speech under the First Amendment (as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). Indiana countered that the statute merely regulates professional conduct, with any burden on speech being incidental.

After hearing arguments from both parties, Chief Judge Holly Brady granted Richwine’s request for a preliminary injunction. She noted that the cease-and-desist order “restricts [Richwine’s] speech in two ways. First, it prohibits [Richwine] from providing education or individualized advice about end-of-life care. Second, the [cease-and-desist order] prevents [Richwine] from advertising those services on their website.” Judge Brady noted that “content-based regulations” like the Indiana statute are “presumptively invalid.” The State of Indiana appealed, asking the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to reverse the grant of a preliminary injunction and arguing that there is “no likelihood” that Richwine would succeed on the merits of her claim.

The Seventh Circuit’s Decision

A U.S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals courtroom. Image via the Library of Congress

The Seventh Circuit was only asked to decide whether the preliminary injunction should stay in place—in other words, whether or not Richwine was able to continue operating while the case worked its way through the system. In an opinion by Judge Ilana Rovner, the Seventh Circuit did keep that preliminary injunction in place and then sent the whole case back to the District Court.

The Seventh Circuit noted that a state may permissibly regulate speech as long as a statute “advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests.” There must be “a reasonably close fit between the law’s means and its ends.”

Indiana claimed the funeral service statute served three interests: preventing the spread of infectious diseases from human remains, protecting general health and safety, and consumer protection. The Seventh Circuit did not dispute that these are legitimate governmental interests. The problem, the court found, was that the statute as applied to Richwine swept far too broadly.

The court stated its view plainly: “This approach furthers the state’s interests the way an atom bomb would further the eradication of a residential ant infestation. It goes much too far. We do not see how preventing the plaintiffs from telling a client about his or her options for the final disposition of their loved one’s remains furthers the state’s professed interests.” The regulatory response, in other words, bore no reasonable relationship to the problem it purported to solve.

 The decision does not exempt death doulas from funeral licensing requirements nationwide or even throughout the Seventh Circuit. 

The court identified several specific problems with Indiana’s application of the law. First, Richwine does not perform cremations, burials, or other physical services—she provides only information and advice, and directs clients to hire licensed funeral directors for actual funeral services. The court questioned how “a consumer learning from Richwine or Death Done Differently that green burial is an option for the final disposition of human remains poses a threat to the consumer or the public.”

Second, no consumer had ever complained about Richwine or Death Done Differently, and the State could not identify any harm she had caused. Quoting the United States Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit noted that when the government defends a speech regulation as addressing anticipated harms, “it must do more than simply posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured … It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural.”

Third, the court pointed to inconsistencies in Indiana law. Indiana Code § 25-15-2-10 expressly permits other individuals to arrange, supervise, or conduct religious or memorial services with the deceased’s remains present, as long as a licensed funeral director handles the final disposition. Yet Richwine was prohibited from engaging in purely advisory activities.

Finally, the court rejected Indiana’s argument that Richwine remained free to engage in other forms of speech. The statute burdened “almost the entirety of their professional speech,” and the fact that some speech remained unregulated did not save the law.

Implications for Death Doulas

The Richwine decision carries important implications for funeral service regulation and occupational licensing, but its limitations must be understood. Because this was an “as-applied” challenge, it addresses only Indiana’s specific statute and its application to Richwine’s services. The decision does not exempt death doulas from funeral licensing requirements nationwide or even throughout the Seventh Circuit. Other states have their own funeral licensing statutes with different definitions, scopes, and enforcement mechanisms. Significantly, many states do not restrict the speech of unlicensed individuals. Death doulas operating outside Indiana must carefully evaluate the licensing laws in their own jurisdictions, as those laws may not share the same constitutional vulnerabilities that doomed Indiana’s enforcement efforts here.

For example, Wisconsin’s statute defines a “funeral director” as “any of the following:”

(a) A person engaged in or conducting, or holding himself or herself out, in whole or in part, as being engaged in any of the following:

1. Embalming or otherwise preparing for the burial or disposal of dead human bodies.
2. Directing and supervising the burial or disposal of dead human bodies.

(c) A person who, in connection with his or her name or funeral establishment, uses the words, “funeral director”, “mortician” or any other title implying that he or she is engaged as a funeral director as defined in this subsection.

Although Wisconsin is within the Seventh Circuit, the Richwine decision does not suggest that this statute is unconstitutional because it does not restrict speech.

Nevertheless, Richwine sends a strong signal that occupational licensing schemes cannot serve as tools to restrict speech, and that regulations touching on expressive activity must be proportionate to demonstrable harms. As the Supreme Court has previously stated, states cannot exercise “unfettered power to reduce a group’s First Amendment right by simply imposing a licensing requirement.”

Conclusion

Unfortunately, Richwine’s struggle to uphold her First Amendment rights is not over. The case has been remanded for further proceedings, which means it has been sent back to the District Court to consider Richwine’s claims, but the Seventh Circuit’s affirmation of the preliminary injunction signals that Richwine is likely to ultimately win.

For death doulas, consumer advocates, and proponents of occupational licensing reform, Richwine stands as a reminder that the First Amendment imposes meaningful limits on how states regulate speech—even when that speech occurs in professional settings.